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Crosby: The World Trade Organization Appellate Body - United States v. Ve

THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION APPELLATE BODYUNITED STATES V. VENEZUELA: INTERPRETING THE
PREAMBLE OF ARTICLE XX-ARE POSSIBILITIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION UNDER ARTICLE XX(g) OF
GATT DISAPPEARING?
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1963, Congress passed the Clean Air Act (CAA) 1 in response
to increasing air pollution caused by automobiles and industrialization.2 Subsequently, in 1990, Congress amended the CAA to address vehicle emissions resulting from fuel constituents. 3 Pursuant
to these amendments, the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) enacted the rule formally entitled the Regulation of
Fuels and Fuel Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Rule) 4 in order to control pollution
caused by the combustion of gasoline manufactured in or imported
into the United States. 5 It is this Gasoline Rule that became the
subject of dispute between the United States and Venezuela on January 23, 1995.6
1. Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act (Clean Air Act), Pub. L. No. 88206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1994)).
2. See Clean Air Act § 101 (a) (2), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (stating Congress
found "that the growth in the amount and complexity of air pollution brought
about by urbanization, industrial development, and the increasing use of motor
vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health and welfare ....
");
Cynthia M. Maas, Should the Wl'O Expand GATT Article XX: An Analysis of United
States - Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
415, 415 (1996) (stating Congress passed CAA to halt air pollution caused by industrialization and automobiles); Pamela Cohn, Automobile Pollution: Japanand the
United States - Cooperation or Competition?, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 179, 193 (1995)
(stating CAA passed as federal response to poor air quality due to industrialization
and use of automobiles).
3. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2684
(1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994)); Maas, supra note 2, at 415 (stating
1990 amendments to CAA addressed vehicle emissions due to fuel constituents);
see generally First Submission of the United States, World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M. 274 (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Submission of the United
States] (stating 1990 amendments to CAA regulate air pollution caused by motor
vehicle fuels).
4. See 40 C.F.R. § 80 (1996). EPA has been given responsibility for enforcing
the CAA. See Clean Air Act § 211(k) (8) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (8) (A).
5. See Maas, supra note 2, at 415 (stating EPA promulgated Gasoline Rule to
facilitate compliance with 1990 CAA amendments).
6. See World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline PanelReport), 35
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In World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report),7 the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body (Appellate Body), in its first proceeding, reviewed a prior panel's
finding that the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule
violated provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
8 The newly
(GATT).
created World Trade Organization (WTO)
was designed to promote free trade while allowing countries to pursue measures designed to protect the environment. 9 However, no
domestic environmental measure has ever survived a challenge
before a GATT dispute resolution panel. 10
Consequently, it was not surprising that the Appellate Body
found the baseline establishment rules to be inconsistent with
GATT.11 The Appellate Body came to this conclusion in two steps.
First, the Appellate Body interpreted and applied the requirements
found within the Article XX(g) exception of GATT. 12 Second, the
Appellate Body interpreted and applied the Preamble to Article
XX.13 Although it found that the baseline establishment rules met
the requirements of the Article XX(g) exception, the Appellate
Body found that the baseline establishment rules did not meet the
requirements of the Article XX Preamble. 14
I.L.M. 274 (Jan. 16, 1996). Pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), consultations first took place between the United States and Venezuela on January 23, 1995. See id. at 277. Similar consultations took place between
the United States and Brazil on May 1, 1995. See id. Neither of these consultations
produced a satisfactory solution to the matter. See id. Thus, a panel was established to examine both Venezuela's and Brazil's complaints. See id. For a discussion of the report of this panel, see infra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
7. 35 I.L.M. 603 (May 20, 1996). This is the first ruling by the World Trade
Organization's Appellate Body.
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatureOct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
9. For a discussion of principles incorporated into the WTO, see infra notes
72-73 and accompanying text.
10. See William J. Snape, III & Naomi B. Lefkovitz, Searchingfor GATT's Environmental Miranda: Are "Process Standards" Getting "DueProcess?", 27 CoRNELL INT'L
L.J. 777, 797 n.124 (1994) (discussing four different GATT panel's findings that
domestic environmental measures are GATT inconsistent). For a discussion of
GATT panels that have found environmental measures to be GATT inconsistent,
see infra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
11. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 633.
12. See id. at 617-26. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's interpretation
and application of the requirements found in Article XX(g), see infra notes 132-64
and accompanying text.
13. See id. at 626-33. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's interpretation
and application of the Article XX Preamble requirements, see infra notes 165-83
and accompanying text.
14. See id. at 617-34.
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This Note will explore the WTO Appellate Body's ruling in
Gasoline Appellate Report.15 Specifically, it will explore how the Appellate Body's ruling will affect the ability of domestic governments
to justify environmental legislation under Article XX.1 6 Initially,
Part II of this note will discuss the CAA, the Gasoline Rule, GATT,
WTO and panel decisions that have interpreted and applied Article
XX of GATT. 17 Then, Part III will set forth the Appellate Body's
analysis as well as a critique of this analysis. 18 Finally, Part IV will
discuss the impact of the Appellate Body's analysis, suggesting that
the Appellate Body's findings may make it more difficult for nations to protect the environment through legislation.1 9
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The CAA and the Gasoline Rule
The CAA divides the United States gasoline market into two
areas. 20 Within the first area, the non-attainment areas, 21 only reformulated gasoline may be sold. 22 Within the second area, consist-

ing of the rest of the United States, 23 both conventional and
24
reformulated gasoline may be sold.

15. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's analysis and findings, see infra
notes 127-83 and accompanying text.
16. For a critical analysis of the Appellate Body's analysis and findings and a
discussion of the impact on environmental legislation, see infra notes 184-219 and
accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of the CAA, the Gasoline Rule, GATT, WTO and panel
decisions that have interpreted and applied Article XX of GATr, see infra notes 20126 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's analysis and a critique of this
analysis, see infra notes 127-214 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of the Appellate Body's analysis, see infra
notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
20. See Clean Air Act § 211(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (1994).
21. See Clean Air Act § 211(k) (10) (D), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(D). Section
7545(k)(10)(D) of the Clean Air states that "It]he 9 ozone nonattainment areas
having a 1980 population in excess of 250,000 and having the highest ozone design value during the period 1987 through 1989 shall be 'covered areas' for purpose of this subsection." Id. One-third of the gasoline consumed in the United
States is consumed within the non-attainment areas. See Oversight of the Reformulated
Gasoline Rule, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
103d Cong. 44 (1994) [hereinafter Senate Oversight Hearing] (testimony of Mary
Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA).
22. See Submission of the United States, supra note 3, at 1 (acknowledging "legislative mandate to 'reformulate' gasoline sold in major population centers . . ").
"Reformulated gasoline" is gasoline that has had its compositional specifications
altered so as to reduce harmful emissions below levels present in 1990 gasoline. See
Clean Air Act § 211(k) (10) (E), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (10)(E).
23. See id.
24. See Maas, supra note 2, at 416-17 (stating conventional gasoline is less
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The Gasoline Rule provides several methods to ensure that reformulated gasoline meets the compositional and performance
specifications that the CAA dictates. UntilJanuary 1, 1998, refiners,
blenders and importers may use the "simple model" to certify that
their gasoline meets the compositional and performance specifications of reformulated gasoline. 25 To this effect, the "simple model"
uses both specific requirements and a non-degradation standard,
which requires that certain gasoline constituents not exceed 1990
levels.2 6 On January 1, 1998, the "simple model" will be replaced by
the "complex model." 2 7 The "complex model," however, is not at
28
issue in the present dispute.
The non-degradation standard's 1990 baselines, an integral
part of the Gasoline Rule's enforcement mechanism, are discriminatory because they differentiate between domestic and foreign refiners. 29 Baselines are established either by statute (statutory
baselines) or by refiners calculating their own baselines (individual
baselines) .3o Domestic refiners must calculate their own individual
baselines using one of three techniques established by the Gasoline
clean than reformulated gasoline but may be sold in less populated areas of United
States). Conventional gasoline is gasoline that is as clean as the average gasoline in
1990. See Clean Air Act § 211(k) (10) (F), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(F).
25. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. 603, 608-09 (May 20, 1996); Senate Oversight Hearing,supra note 21, at 45-46;
Maas, supra note 2, at 417.
26. See Maas, supra note 2, at 417. Under the "simple model," gasoline must
meet certain specifications for Reid Vapor Pressure, oxygen, benzene and toxics
performance to be considered reformulated. See id. In addition, reformulated gasoline must meet certain "non-degradation requirements" by maintaining amounts
of sulphur, olefins and T-90 at or below 1990 levels. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35
I.L.M. at 608; Maas, supra note 2, at 417.
27. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 608-09; Senate Oversight Hearing,
supra note 21, at 45-46; Maas, supra note 2, at 417. Unlike the "simple model," the
"complex model" requires that all ingredients of reformulated gasoline meet specific requirements. See Maas, supra note 2, at 417-18. Thus, the "complex model"
does not apply the non-degradation requirement. See Maas, supra note 2, at 417.
28. The "complex model" has not yet come into force nor does it utilize the
non-degradation standard of the "simple model." For a brief discussion of the
"simple model" and "complex model," see supra notes 25-27 and accompanying
text.
29. See Maas, supra note 2, at 418. The Gasoline Rule relies upon 1990 baselines as a means of ensuring compliance by domestic and foreign refiners and
importers. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (1996).
30. The Gasoline Rule contains detailed baseline establishment rules. See id.
One goal of the Gasoline Rule is to deny refiners the ability to choose between
compliance techniques by eliminating their options. See 40 C.F.R. § 80. This reflects the concern that if given options, refiners will pick the simplest method,
resulting in dirtier overall gasoline. See id. Another goal is to obtain accurate and
reliable data. See id.
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Rule. 31 If a domestic refiner is unable to establish an individual
baseline, it must follow the statutory baseline set forth in the Gasoline Rule. 32 Foreign refiners, however, are treated differently than

domestic refiners in that the Gasoline Rule does not provide for
foreign individual baselines. 33 Rather, foreign refiners must com34
ply with the statutory baselines set forth in the Gasoline Rule.

Limiting individual baselines to domestic refiners may result in
the imposition of different requirements for foreign and domestic
refiners. 35 Under statutory baselines, foreign refiners may be re-6
quired to produce cleaner gasoline than they formerly produced.
Individual baselines, however, allow domestic refiners to produce
gasoline which is dirtier than the average gasoline produced in
1990.3 7 EPA has offered two justifications for limiting individual

39
38
baselines to domestic refiners: feasibility and enforceability.

31. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c). Under the first method, data consisting of "quality (composition and property data) and volume records of gasoline produced in
or shipped from the refinery in 1990, excluding exported gasoline" are used to
establish individual baselines. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c) (1) (i). "A refiner or importer
must determine a baseline fuel parameter value using only Method 1-type data if
sufficient Method i-type data is available . . . ." 40 C.F.R. § 80.91 (c) (4) (i). "If a
refiner has insufficient Method 1-type data for a baseline parameter value determination, it must supplement that data with all available Method 2-type data, until it
has sufficient data." See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c).
Method 2 "type data shall consist of 1990 gasoline blendstock quality data and
1990 blendstock production records...." Id. "If a refiner has insufficient Method
1- and Method 2-type data for a baseline parameter value determination, it must
supplement that data with available Method 3-type data, until it has sufficient data
" Id. Method 3 "type data shall consist of post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/
....
or gasoline quality data and 1990 blendstock and gasoline production records
.... Id.
32. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(b) (4) (iii). Most refiners are unable to calculate individual baselines because they lack the necessary data.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Maas, supra note 2, at 420.
36. See id. Statutory baselines require foreign refiners to produce gasoline
containing the average level of constituents contained in all gasoline consumed in
the United States in 1990. See id. However, this average 1990 standard may represent cleaner gasoline than foreign refiners previously produced. See id. Thus, foreign refiners may be required to produce cleaner gasoline. See id.
37. See id. If a domestic refiner's individual baseline average represents gasoline dirtier than the 1990 average, the domestic refiner will be able to produce
gasoline dirtier than average 1990 levels. See id.
38. See Maas, supra note 2, at 420. Individual baselines are not feasible for
foreign refiners because of problems with establishing the refinery of origin, inadequate data, and changes in foreign sources and production processes. See id.
39. See id. Because U.S. officials cannot inspect and monitor foreign refineries, enforcement of individual baselines would be problematic. See id. (citing
Submission of the United States, supra note 3, at 3, 97, 98).
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GATT

GATT is the principal legal framework that has governed international trade relations since World War 11.40 More than 100 countries have signed the document. 41 In order to achieve its principal
objective of bringing order and stability to international commerce, 42 GATT promotes trade-liberalizing principles including:
(1) most-favored-nation treatment, (2) national treatment, and (3)
the elimination of quantitative restrictions. 43 However, GATT does
provide environmental exceptions 44 to these trade-liberalizing principles in addition to providing a mechanism for dispute
40. See generallyJOHN H. JACKSON,

THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POL-

ICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

(1989)

[hereinafter JACKSON,

WORLD

H. JACKSON & W.J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1986); see also KENNETH W. DAM, THE GATT: LAw AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1970); ROBERT E. HUDEC, THE GATT
LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY (1975); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., IMTRADING] ; JOHN

PLEMENTING THE

TOKYO ROUND:

NATIONAL

CONSTITUTIONS AND

INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC RULES (1984); JOHN H. JACKSON, RESTRUCTURING THE GATT SYSTEM
(1990); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE LAW AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969).

41. See GATT, supra note 8. In 1992, there were 103 contracting parties to
GATT. See id. It is the Protocol of Provisional Application which brings GATT into
effect under international law, not GAT itself. See Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308.
The United States has become a member of GATT by proclamation, making
GATT part of United States domestic law. See Proclamation No. 2761A, 3 C.F.R.
139 (1943-48); JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 75 (citing JACKSON &
DAVEY, supra note 40, at § 4.9); R.E. Hudec, The Legal Status of GATT in the Domestic
Law of the United States, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GATT7 201 (Hiff,Jacobs
& Petersmann eds. 1986)). "International law is part of our law .

. . ."

Paquete

Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). While GATT has not been given the advice and
consent of the Senate nor ratified by the President, Congress has recognized
United States participation through successive legislation. SeeJeanne J. Grimmett,
Environmental Regulation and the GATT, CRS Report for Congress 2 n.2
(1991)(on file with author); see alsoJohn H. Jackson, The General Agreement on TarOifs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 66 MICH. L. REv. 250, 253 (1967);
Thomas E. Skilton, GATT and the Environment in Conflict: The Tuna-Dolphin Dispute
and the Questfor an InternationalConservationStrategy, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 455, 463
n.53 (1993); but cf Ronald A. Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade in United States Domestic Law, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 479, 486 (1990)
(stating Congress has not enacted comprehensive implementing legislation and
clear congressional intent does not exist).
For a general discussion of how international law relates to the United States'
domestic law, see Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: InternationalLaw as Law in the
United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984).
42. See Skilton, supra note 41, at 463 (stating GAT's principle objective is
order and stability in international commerce).
43. See id. For a discussion of GATIT's trade-liberalizing principles, see infra
notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of GATT's environmental exceptions, see infra notes 5662 and accompanying text.
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settlement.
1.

45

GATT's Trade-LiberalizingPrinciples

Article I of GATT embodies the most-favored-nation principle.
This principle requires that the products from one country
be given the most favorable treatment granted to products from
any other country. 47 Trade measures that discriminate between
48
"like products" are prohibited by most-favored-nation treatment.
46

Article III of GATT expresses the national-treatment principle. 49 Because the parties to GATT recognize that internal taxes,
laws, regulations and requirements can be used as effective substitutes for tariff protection,5 0 the national-treatment principle requires that imported goods receive treatment no worse than that of
"domestically produced goods. '5 1 This principle assists the general
goal of reducing restraints on imports because imported products
52
cannot be treated differently than "domestically produced goods."
Article XI expresses the general rule prohibiting the use of
45. For a discussion of GATT's mechanism for settling disputes, see infra
notes 63-66 and accompanying text.

46. See OLIVER

LONG, LAW AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATT MULTILATERAL

TRADE SYSTEM 5 (1985). The most-favored-nation principle is often referred to as
the cornerstone of GATT. See id. This most-favored-nation principle, embedded
in Article I of GATT, states that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
See GATT, supra note 8, art. 1:1.
47. SeeJAcKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 133.
48. See Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATI, U.S. Law and the Environment: A Proposal To Amend the GATT In Light of the Tuna/DolphinDecision, 92 COLUM.
L. REv. 2098, 2101 (1992); Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 10, at 790-91.
49. See GATT, supra note 8, art. 111:2. Article 111:2 of GATI establishes the
national treatment principle in stating:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no
less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in
respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
Id.
50. See GATT, supra note 7, art. III:I; Skilton, supra note 42, at 463.
51. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 189. It should be noted that
Article 111:2 of GATT uses the phrase "like domestic products" rather than "domestically produced goods." See GATT, supranote 8, art. 111:2. GATT does allow, however, "the applications of differential internal transportation charges which are
based exclusively on the economic operation of the means of transport and not on
the nationality of the product." GATT, supra note 8, art. III:4.
52. JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 189; Snape & Lefkovitz, see
supra note 10, at 791 n.86.
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quantitative restrictions. 53 This general rule prohibits the use of
"quotas, import or export licenses or other measures" to restrict imports or exports. 54 There are, however, several notable exceptions
55
to these trade-liberalizing principles.

2. Article XX: GATT's EnvironmentalExceptions
Clauses (b) and (g) of Article XX provide exceptions to
GATT's trade-liberalizing principles. 56 These two exceptions have
been referred to as the "soft" most-favored-nation clause and the
national-treatment obligation. 57 The result is that countries often
invoke these clauses in order to justify the use of trade measures in
58
pursuit of domestic environmental policies.

Unfortunately, "there is little documentary evidence to show
the intentions of the drafters of Article XX." 59 Nevertheless, the
53. GATT, supra note 8, art. XI:I. Article XI:I of GATT states that:
[N]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any
product destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
GATT, supra note 8, art. XI:I.
54. GATT, supra note 8, art. XI:1;JACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at
129.
55. First, there are exceptions designed to safeguard a country's balance of
payments. See GATT, supra note 8, arts. XII, XIII, XLV & XV. Second, there are
exceptions that allow a developing country to promote a particular industry in
order to raise the country's general standard of living. See id. arts. XII, XVIII. Finally, there is an exception that allows restrictions on agricultural and fishery imports to stabilize national agricultural markets. See id. art. XI:2.
56. See id. art. XX(b),(g). The Article XX(b) exception allows measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health ...." Id. art. XX(b). Article XX(g) provides an exception for measures "relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption ...

."

Id. art. XX(g).

57. SeeJAci'SON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 207. It should be noted
that clauses (b) and (d) of Article XX explicitly state that the measures employed
must be necessary to accomplish their purposes. See id. art. XX(b) and (d). In
contrast, clause (g) merely states that a measure must be "primarily aimed at" its
purpose. See id. art. XX(g).
58. For a discussion of cases in which parties invoked Article XX as justification for their domestic environmental policies, see infra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
59. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Trade and Environment: Free International Trade
and Protection of the Environment: IrreconcilableConflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700, 711
(1992). Some commentators have shed light on the drafters' intentions underlying Article XX. First, some commentators have noted that the text of Article XX is
similar to exceptions traditionally written into bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation. SeeJoHNs H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT 1 ch. 28
(1989). Second, others have noted that Article XX has the following characteris-
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two exceptions in Article XX are modified by the Preamble to Article XX, which explicitly states that an exception must not constitute
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries" and
60
must not be a "disguised restriction" on international trade.
Moreover, GATT panel decisions have interpreted Article XX's exceptions to be limited and conditional, 61 especially those exceptions contained in clauses (b) and (g).62
3. Dispute Settlement Under GATT
When GATT was first conceived in 1947, the primary dispute
settlement provision was Article XXIII.63 In 1955, GATT members
tics: (i) it contains no requirement that a country claiming the exception negotiate with affected countries or even provide notice; (ii) the contracting party
claiming the exception evidently decides on its own whether the measure satisfies
Article XX; and (iii) it contains no provision for safeguarding international obligations or for compensating adversely affected countries. See Schoenbaum, supra, at
711.
60. GATT, supra note 8, art. XX. "In other words, a measure properly falling
under Article XX would have to meet some most favored nation and national treatment standard [as contained in the Preamble to Article XX], but not as high a
standard as a measure falling outside Article XX [and thus subject to the standards
contained within Articles I and III of GAT]." Eric Phillips, World Trade and the
Environment: The Cafe Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 827, 849 (1996) (citing JACKSON,
WORLD TRADING,

supra note 40, at 207). The Preamble to Article XX states:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures ....
GATT, supra note 8, art. XX.
61. At least two cases have interpreted the Article XX(d) exception narrowly.
See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at
5.9 & 5.27 (1990) (interpreting Article XX(d) exception narrowly); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATT B.I.S.D.
(30th Supp.) at 5.20 (1984) (same).
62. For a discussion of cases that have strictly and narrowly construed the environmental exceptions of Article XX(b) and (g), see infra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
63. SeeJACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 94 (claiming that Article
XXIII is "centerpiece for dispute resolution process"); see also OLrVIER LONG, LAW
AND ITS LIMITATIONS IN THE GATI MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 73 (1985) (concluding that early dispute settlement process evolved through custom and practice); Robert E. Hudec, Adjudication of InternationalTrade Disputes, 16 THAMES ESSAY
7 (1978) (finding that Article XXIII provides skeletal rules for dispute settlement
process); David M. Schwarz, WTO Dispute Resolution Panels: Failingto Protect Against
Conflicts of Interest, 10 Am. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 955, 958 (1995) (stating that Article
XXIII constitutes primary dispute adjudication provision). Article XXIII of GATT
states in pertinent part as follows:
If any contracting party should consider that any benefit accruing to it
directly or indirectly under this Agreement is being nullified or impaired
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adopted a panel procedure whereby a panel was authorized to investigate a dispute and issue a report stating its recommendations
on how to resolve the dispute. 64 Unfortunately, the panel process
contained two weaknesses: (1) panel reports could be adopted by
consensus only, 65 and (2) the legal significance of panel reports was

unclear.
C.

66

The World Trade Organization

On December 15, 1993, the 117 GATT signatories reached a
tentative agreement in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations (Uruguay Round).67 The objectives of the Uruguay
or that the attainment of any objective of the Agreement is being impeded .

.

. the contracting party may .

.

. make written proposals to the

other contracting party or parties which it considers to be concerned.
GATT, supra note 8, art. XXIII:I.
If under Article XXIII:I, the disputing parties were unable to resolve the dispute, GATT members would, pursuant to Article XXIII:2, investigate and make
recommendations to the disputing parties. See id. art. XXIII:2. In some circumstances, Article XXIII:2 of the GATT may "authorize a contracting party or parties
to suspend application to the other contracting parties of such concessions or
other obligations under the Agreement as [GATT members] determine to be appropriate in the circumstances." Id.
64. SeeJACKSON, WORLD TRADING, supra note 40, at 95; Schwarz, supra note 63,
at 958; see also Hudec, supra note 63, at 7-8 (claiming dispute settlement process
was experimental and primitive prior to panel process).
65. See GATT, supra note 8, art. IX; John H. Jackson, The Legal Meaning of a
GA7T Dispute Settlement Report: Some Reflections, in 1 ToWARDS MORE ErEcrrvE SuORGANIZATIONS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HENRY G.

PERVISION BY INTERNATIONAL

149, 154 (Niels Blokker & Sam Muller eds., 1994) [hereinafter Legal
Meaning]. Members of GATT generally interpret consensus to mean that there
can be no dissent, or at least no significant dissent. See Legal Meaning, supra, at 154.
Thus, if either disputing party disagreed with the decision, the panel's report
could be blocked unilaterally. See id.
SCHERMERS

66. For a discussion of the various legal meanings of a GATT panel report, see

Legal Meaning, supra note 65, at 156-60.
67. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act]. Under GATT,
the first round of multilateral trade negotiations took place in 1947 in Geneva; the
second in Annecy, France in 1949; the third at Torquay, England in 1950; the
fourth at Geneva in 1956; the fifth, the Dillon round, named in honor of U.S.
Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, in Geneva in 1960; the sixth, the Kennedy round, in honor of President John F. Kennedy, in Geneva in 1964; the seventh, the Tokyo round, in Geneva in 1973.

See AsIF H. QURESHi, THE WORLD

NoRMs 3 n.3 (1996).
The eighth such multilateral trade negotiation, the Uruguay Round, opened in
Punta del Este, Uruguay, on September 22, 1986. See id. at 3; 1 THE GATT URUTRADE ORGANIZATION:

IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL TRADE

GUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY 7 (Terence P. Stewart ed. 1993) [hereinafter GAIT NEGOTIATING HISTORY]; Schwarz, supra note 63, at 964. The Uruguay

Round was eventually signed on April 15, 1994. See Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note
10, at 781 n.15.
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Round, reflected in the Punta del Este Declaration, 68 recognized
the need for a more efficient GATT dispute settlement procedure. 69 In an effort to fulfill these objectives, the GATT members
70
created the WTO.
The WXTO does not replace GATT, rather it provides an institutional legal framework for the conduct of trade relations. 71 More68. Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623 (1986) [hereinafter Punta del Este Declaration]. The Punta del Este Declaration is a statement of negotiation objectives

that mandated the Uruguay Round. See GATT

NEGOTIATING HISTORY,

supra note

67, at 7.
69. The Punta del Este Declaration provided that "in order to ensure prompt
and effective resolution of disputes to the benefit of all contracting parties, negotiations shall aim to improve and strengthen the rules and the procedures of the
dispute settlement process." Punta del Este Declaration, supra note 68, at 1623; see
also GATT NEGOTIATING HISTORY, supra note 67, at 58; Schwarz, supra note 63, at
965.
70. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. On January 1,
1995, the WTO Agreement became effective. See Qureshi, supra note 67, at vii.
71. See id. at vii, 3. Article II:1 of the WTO Agreement states that "[t]he WTO
shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters related to the agreements and associated legal
instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement [including GATT]." WTO
Agreement, supra note 70, at art. 11:1. Thus, GATT remains in its amended form
one of the pillars of the newly created WTO. See Qureshi, supranote 67, at vii. The
international community has "denied the existence of GATT 1947 as an organisation [sic]." Id. at 3. The WTO is important, however, because it represents the
commitment of the international trading community to an international trading
system with legal obligations and benefits. See id. For the first time, the international trading system has "a firm constitutional footing." See id.
Unfortunately, international decision-making poses several problems for
democratic governments. First, there is the question of what standard of review
should apply and what amount of deference should be accorded to the decisions
of national governments. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at
345 (1990); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Imports of Fresh and Chilled Atlantic Salmon from Norway,
GATT Doc. ADP/8, at 1 43-67 (1992); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Korea Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Polyacetal Resins from the United States,
GATT Doc. ADP/92, at 1 208-13 (1993); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States- Taxes on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397, 15.11-5.15 (Oct. 11, 1994); Steven
P. Croley &John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM.J. INT'L L. 193 (1996). Second, there is often a
lack of public participation in international decision making. See, e.g., Robert F.
Housman, Democratizing InternationalTrade Decision Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J.
699 (1994); Aubry D. Smith, Executive-BranchRulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the
World Trade Organization: A Proposalto Increase PublicParticipation,94 MICH. L. REv.
1267 (1996). Third, conflicts of interest may arise in international organizations.
See Schwarz, supra note 63, at 958. It is this last problem with which the United
States Congress was concerned when it approved the WTO. See Uruguay Round
Trade Agreements (Dispute Settlement Panels and Procedures), Pub. L. No. 103465, 108 Stat. 4830 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994)). While state sover-
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over, the objectives of this new international trading system are
spelled out in the WTO Agreement. 72 These objectives, however,
73
must be pursued in light of several limitations.
Governed by the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing Disputes (Understanding on Disputes), the WTO provides
for a new dispute resolution process, which has several important
aspects.7 4 First, the WTO establishes an Appellate Body.7 5 Second,
adoption of panel and appellate reports may be blocked by consensus only. 76 Finally, the losing party risks the imposition of trade
eignty has at times caused problems for international decision making, the concept is generally seen as dying in an increasingly interdependent world. See, e.g.,
WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 3
(1964); Wolfgang Friedman, National Sovereignty, International Co-Operation and the
Reality of InternationalLaw, 10 UCLA L. REv. 739 (1963); Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. NEWSL., Mar. 1993, at 1.

72. The WTO's objectives are for member states to achieve: (1) higher standards of living; (2) full employment; (3) a substantial and consistent growth in real
income and effective demand; and (4) an increase in the production of and trade
in goods and services. WTO Agreement, supra note 70, at Preamble. The WTO
pursues these objectives through the "reduction of tariffs and other barriers to
trade and the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations." Id.
73. See id. First, pursuit of the objectives must allow for the "optimal use of
the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development." Id. Second, the need to protect and preserve the environment is recognized. See id. Finally, there is a need for developing countries, especially the least
developed, to possess a share in the growth in international trade that matches the
needs of their economic development. See id.
74. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade - Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter Understanding on Disputes].
75. See id. art. 17. A panel report may be appealed to the Appellate Body of
the WTO. See id.
76. See id. arts. 16.4, 17.14. Thus, unlike the prior GATT panel process, reports cannot be blocked unilaterally. See id. Article 16.4 reads:
Within 60 days of the issuance of a panel report to the Members, the
report shall be adopted at a [Dispute Settlement Body] meeting unless
one of the parties to the dispute formally notifies the [Dispute Settlement
Body] of its decision to appeal or the [Dispute Settlement Body] decides
by consensus not to adopt the report. If a party has notified its intention
to appeal, the report by the panel shall not be considered for adoption by
the [Dispute Settlement Body] until after completion of the appeal. This
adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to express their views on a panel report.
Id. art. 16.4. Article 17.14 reads in relevant part:
An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the [Dispute Settlement
Body] and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless
the [Dispute Settlement Body] decides by consensus not to adopt the
appellate report within thirty days following its issuance to the Members.
This adoption procedure is without prejudice to the right of Members to
express their views on an appellate report.
Id. art. 17.14.
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sanctions if it does not implement the panel or appellate report
77
within a reasonable time.
D.

GATT Article XX Jurisprudence: Panel Decisions

Under the WTO, panel and Appellate Body decisions are binding only on the parties involved in the dispute. 78 Prior panel or
Appellate Body adjudications, therefore, do not possess binding
precedential value. 79 In practice, however, prior adjudications have
some precedential value since many panels make reference to the
findings of prior panels .

0

While there have been eight GATT panel reports where Article
XX(b) and (g) exceptions have been asserted as justification for
the utilization of certain trade measures, none have been success-

ful. 81 Only five of these panel reports, however, concerned legiti-

mate environmental concerns. 82 Thus, a review of these five panel
77. See id. art. 22.1. These trade sanctions can take the form of either suspended concessions or retaliation. See id. Articles 22.1 reads:
Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and
rulings are not implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the suspension of concessions or other
obligations is preferred to full implementation of a recommendation to
bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements. Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered
agreements.
Id. However, at least one scholar contends that the United States Constitution
authorizes rejection of panel and appellate reports. See The GATT Lady Sings:
What the New WTO Will Mean for the U.S. and World Trade, 11 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) No. 15, at 595 (Apr. 13, 1994).
78. See Understanding on Disputes, supra note 74, arts. 19.1, 19.1 n.9. Article
19.1 reads:
Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member
concerned bring the measure into conformity with that Agreement. In
addition to its recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the
recommendations.
Id. art. 19.1. It is important to note that "[t]he 'Member concerned' is the party to
the dispute to which the panel or Appellate Body recommendations are directed."
Id. art. 19.1 n.10.
79. See id. arts. 19.1 & 19.1 n.10.
80. See GATT: Implications on Environmental Laws: HearingBefore the Subcomm.
on Health and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong.
1, 29 (1991) (testimony of Joshua Bolten); Jan Klabbers, Jurisprudence in International Trade Law: Article XX of the GATT,26J. WORLD TRADE 63, 65 (1992).
81. For an analysis of several of these unsuccessful decisions, see Steve
Charnovitz, Exploring the EnvironmentalExceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. WoRLD
TRADE 37 (1991);Jan Klabbers, supra note 80, at 65.
82. For a discussion of five cases where legitimate environmental concerns
were involved in asserting Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions as justifications for
trade measures, see infra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
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reports is necessary.

In GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada-Salmon),83 the
United States claimed that the export restrictions maintained by
Canada on unprocessed salmon and herring were inconsistent with
Canada's obligations under GATT.8 4 The parties to the dispute and
the panel agreed that the export restrictions were inconsistent with
the general rule against quantitative restrictions embodied in Article XI of GAT-. 8 5 Canada, however, invoked Article XX(g) as justi86
fication for the export restrictions.
The panel's interpretation and application of Article XX(g)
consisted of several steps. 8 7 First, the panel and the parties agreed
that salmon and herring stocks were "exhaustible natural resources" and that the harvest limitations were "restrictions on domestic production" within the meaning of Article XX(g).88
Second, the panel found that to be considered "relating to" within
the meaning of Article XX(g), a trade measure had to be only "primarily aimed" at the conservation of an exhaustible natural re-

83. Mar. 22, 1988, GAT-T B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 98 (1989).
84. See id. at 3.1. The challenged regulations were promulgated under the
authority of the Canadian Fisheries Act of 1970. See id. at 2.1. The first regulation challenged was the Regulation Respecting Commercial Fishing for Salmon in
the Waters of British Columbia and Canadian Fisheries Waters in the Pacific
Ocean, which provides "[n ] o person shall export from Canada any sockeye or pink
salmon unless it is canned, salted, smoked, dried, pickled or frozen and has been
2.2. The
inspected in accordance with the Fish Inspection Act . . . ." Id. at
second regulation challenged was the Regulation Respecting Fishing for Herring
in Canadian Fisheries Waters on the Pacific Coast. See id. at at 2.3.
85. See id. at 4.1. For a discussion of Article XI of GATI', see supra notes 5355 and accompanying text. For the pertinent textual language of Article XI, see
supra note 53.
86. See Canada-Salmon,GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 1 4.1. Canada claimed
that the export prohibitions were justified under Article XX(g) because the export
prohibitions were "relating to" the conservation of salmon and herring stocks and
were made effective "in conjunction with" restrictions on the domestic harvesting
of salmon and herring. See id. at 1 4.1. It is important to note that although a
domestic measure may be inconsistent with a particular trade-liberalizing principle
embodied within GATT, it may still be justified under an Article XX exception.
For the text and a discussion of Article XX(g), see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
87. See Canada-Salmon,GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 4.5. The panel noted
that the only previous case that had addressed Article XX(g) was GAiT Dispute
Panel Report on United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Productsfrom
Canada (United States Tuna). See id. (citing Feb. 22, 1982, GAT B.I.S.D. (29th
Supp.) at 91 (1983)). See id. However, since that case had not addressed the
meaning of the terms "relating to" and "inconjunction with," the panel decided to
interpret these terms by itself. See id.
88. See id. at 4.4. For the text of Article XX(g), see supra note 56.
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source, not "necessary" or "essential" to its conservation.8 9 Third,
the panel found that a trade measure can only be made effective "in

conjunction with" domestic restrictions if it was "primarily aimed at
rendering effective these restrictions." 90 Finally, applying its interpretation of Article XX(g) to Canada's export prohibitions, the
panel found that the prohibitions were unjustifiable because they
were primarily aimed at neither the conservation of fish stocks nor

rendering effective the restrictions on fish harvesting. 9 1
In GATT DisputePanelReport on Thailand - Restrictions on Importa-

tion of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand Cigarettes),92 the
United States challenged the restrictions on cigarette imports93
maintained by the Royal Thai Government as being inconsistent
89. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports
of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada-Salmon), Mar. 22, 1988, GATT
B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 4.6 (1989). The panel noted that some subparagraphs
of Article XX state that the measure must be "necessary" or "essential" to the
achievement of the policy purpose, while subparagraph (g) only refers to measures
"relating to" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. See id. This suggests that Article XX(g) covers a wider range of measures than other subparagraphs of Article XX. See id. The panel noted, however, that the Preamble to
Article XX indicates that the purpose of including Article XX(g) in GATT "was not
to widen the scope for measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources." Id.
Therefore, the panel found that a trade measure had to be "primarily aimed" at
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources to fall within the meaning of
"relating to" in Article XX(g). See id.
90. Id. The panel noted that the phrase "in conjunction with" had to be interpreted in a way "that ensures that the scope of possible actions ...corresponds to
the purpose for which it was included in the General Agreement." Id.
91. See id. at 4.7. Canada argued that while the restrictions were not per se
conservation measures for the fish in question, they were an integral part of the
conservation and management of herring and pink and sockeye salmon. See id.
Canada supported its argument by pointing out that it had statistical evidence
which necessitated the domestic harvesting restrictions. See id. The panel found,
however, that the following factors, taken together, showed that the export
prohibitions were not primarily aimed at the conservation of fish and at rendering
effective the restrictions on harvesting fish. See id. First, the panel noted that Canada collects statistical data on other species of fish without imposing export
prohibitions on them. See id. Second, statistics on unprocessed herring and unprocessed salmon would be collected if these fish were exported. See id. Third, the
export prohibitions limit access to unprocessed salmon and herring supplies only,
not salmon and herring supplies in general. See id. Finally, Canada limits the
purchase of unprocessed salmon and herring by foreign processors and consumers
only, not by domestic processors and consumers. See id.
92. Nov. 7, 1990, GA'T B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1991).
93. See id. at 6. Under Section 27 of the Tobacco Act, 1966, the "importation or exportation of tobacco seeds, tobacco plants, tobacco leaves, plug tobacco,
shredded tobacco and tobacco is prohibited except by license of the Director-General of the Excise Department or a competent officer authorized by him." Id. at
6. Under Section 4 of the Act, tobacco is defined as "'cigarettes, cigars, other
tobacco rolled for smoking, prepared shredded tobacco including chewing to-
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with GATT. 94 Thailand submitted that the restrictions on imports
were justifiable under Article XX(b). 95 The panel found that the
import restrictions were inconsistent with Article XI:1.96 In addition, the panel found that the import restrictions were not justified
under Article XX(b) because they failed to meet the "necessary"
97
requirement therein.
In GATT Dispute PanelReport on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin 1),98 Mexico challenged the United
States' embargo of tuna imports under the Marine Mammal Protec-

tion Act (MMPA) 99 as inconsistent with GATT. 10 0 As its initial debacco.'" See id. The only entity to be granted licenses, the Thai Tobacco Monop-

oly, has imported cigarettes on only three occasions since 1966. See id.
94. See id. at 1 12. The United States argued that the import restrictions constituted a quantitative restriction inconsistent with Article XI because the Thai Tobacco Monopoly had "imported cigarettes on only three occasions and the
Government refused to consider import license applications from any other entity." Id. at 1 16. Also, the United States argued that the import restrictions were
not justified by the Article XI:2(c) exception to the Article XI:I prohibition against
quantitative restrictions because cigarettes were not an agricultural or fisheries
product within the meaning of Article XI. See id. at 11 12, 18. For a discussion of
the general rule against quantitative restrictions contained in Article XI, see supra
notes 53-55 and accompanying text. For a discussion of some notable exceptions
to the general rule of Article XI, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
95. See Thailand Cigarettes, GATT] B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 1 14. Thailand argued that the import restrictions were justified under Article XX(b) because the
objective of the import restrictions was the health policy of reducing the consumption of cigarettes. Id. at 11 21-35. For the text and a discussion of Article XX(b),
see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
96. See Thailand Cigarettes,GATT" B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 1 67.
97. See id. at 1 74. In finding a "necessary" requirement in Article XX(b), the
panel stated:
[A] contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with other
GATT provisions as "necessary" . . . if an alternative measure which it
could reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
with other GATT provisions is available to it. By the same token, in cases
where a measure consistent with other GATT" provisions is not reasonably
available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency
with other GAT provisions.
Id. (quoting GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GAT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 11 5.26 (1990)). In
effect, governments may, through the least trade restrictive means, set levels of
health and environmental protection, but it is the panel that determines whether
the levels are justified. See Smith, supra note 71, at 1273.
98. Unadopted, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993).
99. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-552, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-62, 1371-84, 1401-07 (1994)). The
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) can be characterized as a United
States restriction on yellowfin tuna imports from those countries that kill an excessive number of dolphins while catching tuna in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.
See Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 10, at 782. Central to the dispute was the ban
(embargo) of certain tuna caught by a tuna fishing technique that kills and maims
dolphins. See Tuna/Dolphin I, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 1 2.5.
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fense, the United States claimed that the embargoes on tuna were
consistent with GATT. 10 1 If the embargoes were found to be inconsistent with GATT, the United States claimed, in the alternative,
that these restrictions were justifiable under Article XX.102
Making a distinction between actual products and practices
that produce products, 10 3 the panel found that the embargoes were
not internal regulations consistent with Article 111,1°4 but quantitative restrictions that violated Article XI.1° 5 The panel then determined that the tuna embargo could not be justified under Article
XX(b) for two reasons. First, the health and safety exception contained in Article XX(b) could not be applied extra-jurisdictionally. 10 6 Second, Article XX(b)'s "necessary" requirement had not
100. See id. at 7 3.10 - 3.26. Mexico argued that the MMPA was inconsistent
with Articles XI, XIII and III of GATT. See id. For a criticism of the panel's decision, see Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard, Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed
Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protection of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 385, 399401 (1993). At best, the panel's treatment of this case indicates
GATF's disregard of conservation policies passed in a democratic fora. See Snape
& Lefkovitz, supranote 10, at 785. At worst, it shows GATT's desire to place international trade beyond the reach of any regulatory oversight. See id.
101. See Tuna/Dolphin I, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 7 3.10-3.26. The
United States argued that the embargoes were not inconsistent with GATT, but
qualified as an internal regulation and met the national treatment requirement of
Article III:4 because the standards that determined application of the embargoes
were comparable to those applied to domestic tuna harvesting. See id.
102. See id. at
3.27-3.32. The United States argued that the MMPA embargo was justified under Article XX(b) because the embargo was necessary to
protect the life and health of dolphins. See id. at 11 3.33-3.39. Also, the United
States argued that the MMPA embargo was justified under the Article XX(g) exception. See id. at 11 3.40-3.52. For the textual language and a discussion of Article XX(b) and (g), see supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
103. See Tuna/Dolphin I, GATI B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 1 5.11. While an importing country may distinguish between actual products, it may not distinguish
imported products not produced in conformity with the importing country's domestic policies from products produced in conformity with the importing country's domestic policies. SeeJoel P. Trachtman, GATT"Dispute Settlement Panel,86 Am.
J. INT'L L. 142, 147 (1992).
104. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin 1), unadopted, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 1 5.14
(1993). In keeping with the above distinction, the panel found that Article III
covers "only measures applied to imported products that are of the same nature as
those applied to domestic products .

. . ."

Id. at

1

5.11. Therefore, Article III

cannot be employed as a means of evading Article XI in order to regulate production methods that do not affect the character of the imported product. See id.
105. See id. at 1 5.18. The United States did not present any argument that
the embargoes were consistent with Article XI.
106. See id. at 11 5.25-5.27. In making this decision the panel relied upon
three factors: (1) the drafting history, (2) the purpose of Article XX, and (3) the
consequences of applying Article XX extra-jurisdictionally. See id. at 11 5.26-5.27.
First, the drafting history showed that the drafters of Article XX(b) were concerned with protecting life or health within the jurisdiction of an importing country. See id. at 1 5.26. Second, it noted that the purpose of Article XX is to allow the
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been met.10 7 Finally, the panel found that Article XX(g) could not
justify the tuna embargo because its exception could not be applied
extra-jurisdictionally. 108

In GATT DisputePanel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin I1),109 only one year after Mexico's successful challenge to the MMPA, the European Community (EC)
and the Netherlands challenged the MMPA's tuna embargoes as
contrary to Article XI of GATT. 1 10 Not surprisingly, the United
States again claimed that the tuna embargoes were justifiable under
Article XX. 11 1 Making the same product-process distinction as in
Tuna/Dolphin J,112 the panel found that the tuna embargoes were
quantitative restrictions inconsistent with Article XI, rather than internal regulations allowed under Article 111.113
The panel developed a three-step analysis in evaluating the
pursuit of domestic policy goals through the promulgation of measures that are
inconsistent with GATT. See id. at 5.27. Thus, applying Article XX extra-jurisdictionally would allow each GATT member to unilaterally determine those policies
from which other GATT members would not deviate without jeopardizing their
own rights under GATT. See id.
107. See id. at 5.28. The requirements of Article XX(b) were not met because the United States had not "exhausted all options reasonably available to it."
Id. Also, a "limitation on trade based on such unpredictable conditions could not
be regarded as necessary. . ." within the meaning of Article XX(b). Id.
108. See id. at 7 5.30-5.34. The panel's decision was based on two factors.
First, under Article XX(g), a measure could only be considered to have been taken
"in conjunction with" production restrictions "if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions." Id. at 5.31. A country can control production or
consumption of an exhaustible resource only when it is within that country's jurisdiction. See id. Second, like clause (b) of Article XX, allowing clause (g) of Article
XX to apply extrajurisdictionally would allow a country to unilaterally determine
policies from which other countries could not deviate for fear ofjeopardizing their
own rights under GATT. See id. at 5.32.
109. 33 I.L.M. 839 (June 1994).
110. See id. at
3.1-3.6. There are at least two reasons why another party
would challenge the MMPA after Mexico's successful challenge in Tuna/Dolphin I.
First, any recommendation made by a panel or Appellate Body is binding only on
the parties to the dispute. See Understanding on Disputes, supra note 74, arts. 16.4,
17.14. The EC and the Netherlands were not parties in Tuna/DolphinI. See GATT
Dispute Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/
Dolphin 1), unadopted, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at
1.1-1.3 (1993). Second,
the panel report of Tuna/DolphinIwas never adopted by the parties. See id. For a
discussion of the binding effect of panel or Appellate Body recommendations, see
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
111. See Tuna/DolphinII, 33 I.L.M. at
5.11, 5.28. The United States argued
that the tuna embargoes were justified by Article XX(g) "as measures relating to
the conservation of dolphins, an exhaustible natural resource." Id. at 5.11. The
United States also argued that the tuna embargoes were justified by Article XX(b)
.as measures necessary to protect the life and health of dolphins." Id. at 5.28.
112. See id. at 1 5.6-5.10. For a discussion of Tuna/Dolphin land the product/process distinction, see supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
113. See Tuna/Dolphin II, 33 I.L.M. at 17 5.9-5.10.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/7

18

19981

Crosby: The World Trade Organization
Appellate Body - United States v. Ve
VENEZUELA

tuna embargo provisions under both Articles XX(g) and XX(b).
Under the first prong of the analysis, the panel determined that the
MMPA's underlying policy fell within the parameters of Article
XX's environmental policies. 1 14 Second, it determined that the
measures did not fall within the requirements of Article XX. 115 It is
important to note that, under this second step, the panel found
that Article XX(g) may justify measures related to the conservation
of exhaustible natural resources even if those resources are outside
the country's jurisdiction. 16 Finally, although the panel noted that
the third prong of the analysis required a determination of whether
the measure was applied in a manner which would constitute a
114. See id. at 1 5.12, 5.29. For several reasons, the panel determined that
the MMPA tuna embargoes met the first prong of the three step analysis under
both Articles XX(b) and XX(g). First, the text of Article XX(g) does not place any
limitation on the location of the natural resource. See id. at 5.15. Second, two
previous panels made no distinction between fish caught inside or outside territorial jurisdictions when considering migratory fish. See id. Third, GATT does not
absolutely proscribe measures relating to things or actions outside a party's territorial jurisdiction. See id. I at 5.16. Finally, under general international law, states
are not barred from regulating their nationals and vessels with respect to persons,
animals, plants and natural resources outside their territories. See id.
115. See id. at 5.12. This prong of the test focused on the particular requirements of Articles XX(b) and (g). See id. at 11 5.27, 5.39. The tuna embargoes did
not pass this second requirement contained within clauses (b) and (g) of Article
XX. See id. Following prior panel decisions, the panel found that the term "necessary" in XX(b) requires that a party use a measure consistent with GATT provisions
if such a measure is reasonably available. See id. at 5.35. If the measure is inconsistent, the party must use the least inconsistent measure from among the measures reasonably available. See id. Significantly, the panel did not consider that
some measures may be more environmentally sustainable, politically achievable, or
more enforceable than the least GAT' inconsistent measure. See Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 10, at 787.
Additionally, the panel found that a measure must be "primarily aimed at"
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and at rendering effective restrictions on domestic production and consumption to be justified by Article XX(g).
See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
(Tuna/Dolphin I1), 33 I.L.M. at 1 5.21 (June 1994). Because the tuna embargoes
would be effective only if countries changed their harvesting practices, the embargoes failed the "primarily aimed at" test. See id. at 11 5.23, 5.27. One criticism of
this panel's analysis is that the panel injected a causation test not supported by the
text of Article XX. See Snape & Lefkovitz, supra note 10, at 788.
116. See Tuna/DolphinII, 33 I.L.M. at 1 5.15. The panel observed that:
[T]he text of Article XX(g) does not spell out any limitation on the location of the exhaustible natural resource to be conserved .... The nature
and precise scope of the policy area named in the Article . . . is not

spelled out or specifically conditioned by the text of the Article, in particular with respect to the location of the exhaustible natural resource to be
conserved. The Panel noted that two previous panels have considered
Article XX(g) to be applicable to policies related to migratory species of
fish, and had made no distinction between fish caught within or outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party that had invoked this
provision.
Id.
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means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade, the panel did not consider this
prong because the tuna embargo did not pass the second prong of
117
the analysis.
In World Trade OrganizationDispute PanelReport on United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Panel
Report), 118 Venezuela and Brazil claimed that the Gasoline Rule
promulgated by EPA was contrary to both Article I and III of
GATT. 1 19 In response, the United States argued that the Gasoline
120
Rule was justified under Article XX(b), (d) and (g) of GATT.
The panel found that the baseline establishment rules of the Gaso12 1
line Rule were inconsistent with Article III:4 of GAT.
Dismissing the United States' arguments for justification under
Articles XX(d) and (g), 122 the panel listed three elements that a
regulation must satisfy to be justified under Article XX(b). 123 First,
the regulation must fall within the range of policies designed to
117. See id. at

5.12, 5.27.

118. 35 I.L.M. 274 (Jan. 16, 1996).
119. See id. at 279. Venezuela and Brazil claimed that:
[T] he rule allowing an importer which was also a foreign refiner to establish its individual baseline, provided that it imported into the United
States at least 75 percent of the gasoline produced at that refinery in 1990
("75 % rule"), granted an advantage to gasoline exported from certain
third countries in violation of Article I of [GATT].
Id. at 280. Venezuela and Brazil "argued that the Gasoline Rule, by denying foreign refiners the possibility to establish an individual baseline, violated Article 111:4
because it accorded less favourable treatment to imported gasoline, both reformulated and conventional, than to US gasoline." Id. For the textual language and a
discussion of Articles I and III of GATT, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying
text.
120. See GasolinePanel Report, 35 I.L.M. at 279-80. The United States argued
that the Gasoline Rule was justified under Article XX(b) because the Gasoline
Rule was necessary to the protection of human, animal and plant life or health. See
id. at 284-87. Further, the United States argued that the Gasoline Rule was necessary to secure compliance with the Clean Air Act, and thus within the meaning of
the Article XX(d) exception. See id. at 287-88. Moreover, the United States argued
that the Gasoline Rule was justified under Article XX(g) because the Gasoline
Rule was a program to preserve clean air. See id. at 288.
121. See id. at 294-95. Stating that the "treatment no less favourable" language
of Article III:4 required equality of opportunities for imported and domestic products, the panel found that imported gasoline was prevented from benefitting from
the favourable sales conditions provided for domestic gasoline. See id.
122. See id. at 298-300. Concerning Article XX(d), the panel found that the
baseline establishment rules were inconsistent with Article 111:4 because they did
not secure compliance with the baseline system, rather they were simply rules for
determining baselines. See id. at 298; Maas, supra note 2, at 429 n.98. The panel
found that the baseline establishment rules were not justified under Article XX (g)
because they were not "primarily aimed at" the conservation of a natural resource.
See Gasoline Panel Report, 35 I.L.M. at 298-300; Maas, supra note 2, at 429 n.98.
123. See GasolinePanel Report, 35 I.L.M. at 296.
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protect human, animal or plant life or health. 124 Second, the regulation must be necessary to the fulfillment of the policy's objectives. 125 Third, the regulation must meet the requirements of the
1
Preamble to Article XX. 26
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Narrative Analysis

In World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appel127 the Appellate Body addressed the issue of the proper
late Rpt),
interpretation of Article XX(g) of GATT.1 28 Focusing on Article
XX(g), the United States appealed from certain conclusions of law
and legal interpretations of the Gasoline Panel.1 29 In response,
Venezuela and Brazil supported the findings of the Gasoline Panel
concerning Article XX(g),130 but argued that if the findings of the
Gasoline Panel were overturned, the United States had nevertheless
124. See id. The panel agreed with the parties that a policy to reduce air pollution resulting from gasoline consumption was within the range of policies
designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health. See id.
125. See id. Applying the reasoning of two prior panels, this panel considered
the term "necessary" to mean the absence of alternative measures consistent with
GATT, or less inconsistent with it, which a country could reasonably be expected to
employ. See id. at 296-97. Furthermore, the panel was not convinced that the
United States had met its burden of proving that other measures reasonably available to it and less inconsistent with GATT were not available. See id. at 297.
126. See id. at 296. Since the baseline establishment rules failed the necessary
test of Article XX(b), the panel did not examine whether the regulation before it
met the requirements of the Preamble to Article XX. See id. at 298.
127. 35 I.L.M. at 603 (May 20, 1996).
128. See id. This was an appeal from the panel's decision in Report of the Panel
on United States - Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Panel
Report). See 35 I.L.M. 274 (Jan. 16, 1996). For a discussion of the panel decision,
see supra notes 118-26 and accompanying text.
129. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 606. The United States challenged the panel's interpretation of Article XX(g) as a whole. See id. at 613. Specifically, the United States claimed that the panel erred in not finding the Gasoline
Rule's baseline establishment rules a measure "relating to" the conservation of natural resources within the meaning of Article XX(g) of GATT. See id. The United
States claimed that the Gasoline Panel erred in three ways: (1) by failing to further
interpret and apply Article XX(g); (2) by not finding that the baseline establishment rules satisfied the other requirements of Article XX; and (3) by not finding
that the baseline establishment rules satisfied the introductory provisions of Article
XX. See id. For a discussion of the Gasoline Rule and Article XX(g), see supra
notes 20-39 & 56-62 and accompanying text.
130. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 614. Venezuela stated that for a
measure to fall within the meaning of "relating to" the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources, it must be primarily intended to achieve a conservation goal and
have a positive conservation effect. See id. Because Venezuela submitted that the
United States did not meet its burden with respect to the "relating to" requirement
of Article XX(g), Venezuela claimed that it was unnecessary for the Appellate Body
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failed to satisfy the additional requirements set forth in Article
13 1
XX(g).
1.

Measures

For several reasons, the Appellate Body determined that the
proper meaning of the term "measures," located in both clause (g)
and the Preamble to Article XX, was a moot issue. 132 First, the
panel had found that only the baseline establishment rules, and not
the Gasoline Rule as a whole, were inconsistent with Article III:4
and unjustifiable under Article XX(g).1 33 Second, the panel had

followed the practice of earlier panels in applying Article XX to
only those provisions found to be inconsistent with Article 111:4.134
Finally, the Appellate Body stated that no party had suggested an
interpretation of "measures" that required the application of Article XX to any provision of the Gasoline Rule other than the baseline establishment rules.' 3 5 Accordingly, the Appellate Body found
to address the further requirements of Article XX(g) and the Preamble to Article
XX. See id.
131. See id. Brazil and Venezuela argued that because the measures in issue
were restrictions upon the consumption of certain kinds of gasoline, rather than
restrictions imposed as direct limits on the production or consumption of clean
air, the measures did not satisfy the "made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" requirement of Article XX(g). Id.
Additionally, Venezuela and Brazil submitted that because the measures in issue
constituted "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the
same conditions prevail," as well as a "disguised restriction on international trade,"
they violated the requirements set forth in the Preamble to Article XX(g). Id.
132. See id. at 617.
133. See id. The Appellate Body noted that because the panel had considered
only the baseline establishment rules to be at issue, there was no need to examine
whether the Gasoline Rule as a whole or any of its other parts were justifiable
under Article XX(g). See id.
134. See id. at 618 n.28 (citing GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397 (Oct. 11, 1994); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345 (1990); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, GATTl B.I.S.D.
(30th Supp.) at 140 (1984)).
135. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 618 (May 20, 1996). While in earlier submissions the United States had
maintained that "the Gasoline Rule" should be examined in light of Article XX(g),
the United States later confirmed, in its Post-Hearing Memorandum, dated April
1, 1996, that the "measures" in issue were the baseline establishment rules. See id.
at 618 n.29. Similarly, in its final submission to the Appellate Body, dated April 1,
1996, Brazil stated that the measures with which this appeal was concerned were
the baseline establishment rules, rather than the Gasoline Rule itself. See id.
Thereafter, Brazil maintained that it challenged only the discriminatory methods
of establishing baselines, not the entire rule itself. See id. Further, in its summary
statement, dated March 29, 1996, Venezuela stated that it challenged that aspect of
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that the issue had already been settled.13 6
2. Relating to the Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources
The Appellate Body levied several criticisms against the Gasoline Panel's interpretation of the "relating to the conservation of
137
exhaustible natural resources" requirement of Article XX(g).
First, although the panel had concluded that the baseline establishment rules were not justified by Article XX(g) because they were
138
not "primarily aimed" at the conservation of natural resources,
the panel had injected the new phrase "direct connection" into its
analysis. 13 9 The Appellate Body noted that the panel's decision crethe Gasoline Rule which requires imported gasoline to use a different system of
regulatory baselines than United States gasoline. See id.
136. See id. at 617-18. The Appellate Body criticized the panel's analysis on
this point. By using terms such as "the difference in treatment," "the less favourable treatment" or "the discrimination" to refer to the baseline establishment
rules, the panel was referring to the baseline establishment rules in terms of its
legal conclusion in respect of Article III:4. See id. at 619.
137. See id. at 618.
138. See id. In interpreting the phrase "relating to," the Gasoline Panel had
quoted the following passage:
[A] s the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX:(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for
measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the
commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of
policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustive natural resources. The
Panel concluded for these reasons that, while a trade measure did not
have to be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible
natural resource, it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an
exhaustible natural resource to be considered as "relating to" conservation within the meaning of Article XX: (g).
Id. at 619 (citing World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Panel Report), 35 I.L.M. 274 (an. 16, 1996); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada-Salmon), Mar.
22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 4.6 (1989)).
139. See id. at 618-19. The Gasoline Panel had introduced the new phrase
"direct connection" in the following manner:
The Panel then considered whether the precise aspects of the Gasoline
Rule that it had found to violate Article III - the less favourable baseline
establishment methods that adversely affected the conditions of competition for imported gasoline - were primarily aimed at the conservation of
natural resources. The Panel saw no direct connection between less favourable treatment of imported gasoline that was chemically identical to
domestic gasoline, and the U.S. objective of improving air quality in the
United States. Indeed, in the view of the Panel, being consistent with the
obligation to provide no less favourable treatment would not prevent that
attainment of the desired level of conservation of natural resources under
the Gasoline Rule. Accordingly, it could not be said that the baseline
establishment methods that afforded less favourable treatment to imported gasoline were primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources. In the Panel's view, the above-noted lack of connection was
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ated confusion because the panel had originally stated that there
was "no direct connection" between the baseline establishment
rules and the objective of improving air quality, but thereafter concluded that the baseline establishment rules were not "primarily
aimed" at the conservation of natural resources. 40 However, the
panel had not made clear whether the phrase "direct connection"
was a synonym for "primarily aimed at" or a completely new
requirement. 141

The Appellate Body's second criticism was that the Gasoline
Panel had erred in referring to its legal conclusion on Article 111:4
instead of the baseline establishment rules themselves.1 4 2 Third,
the Appellate Body stated that the Gasoline Panel appeared to have
mistakenly applied the "necessary" requirement of Article XX(b) to
Article XX(g).1 43 Finally, the Appellate Body charged that the Gas-

oline Panel failed to apply Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
14 5
Law of Treaties,144 a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation.
Consequently, the Appellate Body interpreted Article XX(g)
underscored by the fact that affording treatment of imported gasoline
consistent with its Article 111:4 obligations would not in any way hinder
the United States in its pursuit of its conservation policies under the Gasoline Rule. Indeed, the United States remained free to regulate in order
to obtain whatever air quality it wished. The Panel therefore concluded
that the less favourable baselines establishment methods at issue in this
case were not primarily aimed at the conservation of natural resources.
Id. at 619 (citing Canada-Salmon,GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 6.40).
140. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 619-20.
141. See id. at 620. "The Panel did not try to clarify whether the phrase 'direct
connection' was being used as a synonym for 'primarily aimed at' or whether a new
and additional element (on top of 'primarily aimed at') was being demanded." Id.
142. See id. The Gasoline Panel had considered whether the "less favourable
treatment" of imported gasoline was "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources. See id. While there must be a finding of "less favourable treatment"
under Article 111:4 before proceeding to an analysis of Article XX(g), this is a conclusion of law. See id. As the Preamble of Article XX makes clear, the Gasoline
Panel should have asked itself whether the baseline establishment rules were "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources. See id.
143. See id. at 620-22. The text of Article XX(b) includes the word "necessary." See GATT, supra note 8, art. XX(b). In contrast, the text of Article XX(g)
includes the phrase "primarily aimed at." See id. art. XX(g). Thus, it would appear
that the Appellate Body suggested that the use of different language in Article
XX(b) and (g) implies different requirements. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35 I.L.M. at 620 (May 20, 1996). For the textual language and a discussion of Article XX (b) and (g), see supra notes 56-62 and
accompanying text.
144. OpenedforsignatureMay 23, 1969, T.S. No. 58, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Article 31 states in relevant part: "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purposes." Id.
art. 31. By not applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, the Gasoline Panel
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by using Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.14 6 Noting that Article
XX(g) contains the words "relating to," while other subsections use
different phrases, 147 the Appellate Body concluded it was not reasonable to believe that every subsection required "the same kind or
degree of connection or relationship between the measure under
appraisal and the state interest or policy sought to be promoted or
realized.'

48

Nevertheless, the Appellate Body noted that Article 31

requires that Article XX(g) and its phrase, "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources," needed to be read in such
1 49
a way as to give effect to the purposes and objectives of GATT.
The Appellate Body stated that two prior panels recognized this
principle. 150 On the basis of this reasoning, as well as the reasoning
failed to recognize the different requirements contained in Articles XX(b) and
(g). See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 621-23.
145. See id. at 620. The Appellate Body listed several sources of authority to
show that Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is a rule of customary or general
international law. See id. at 621 n.34 (citing Golder v. United Kingdom, 18 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1995); Restrictions to the Death Penalty Cases, 70 I.L.R. 449
(Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1986); Territorial Dispute Case (Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), 1994 I.C.J. 6 (June 27); D. CARRE u, DROIT INTERNATIONAL 140 (3d ed. 1991); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 1271-75 (Jennings &

Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992);Jimenez de Arechaga, InternationalLaw in the Past Third of
a Century 159 RECUEIL DES Couis. 42 (1978)). The WTO has been directed, by
Article 3(2) of the Understanding on Disputes, to apply such "customary rules of
interpretation of public international law" when seeking to clarify the provisions of
the GATT. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 621 (citing Understandingon
Disputes, supra note 74, art. 3(2)).
146. See id. For the textual language of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention, see
supra note 144.
147. See GasolineAppellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 621. In enumerating the various
types of measures that WTO members may use to pursue differing state policies,

Article XX uses different terms for different types of measures: "necessary" in
paragraphs (a), (b) and (d); "essential" in paragraph (j); "relating to" in
paragraphs (c), (e) and (g); "involving" in paragraph (i); "in pursuance of" in
paragraph (h); and "for the protection of' in paragraph (f). See id.
148. Id. at 622.
149. See id. Article XX(g)'s phrase "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" may not be read to subvert the purpose and object of Article III:4. See id. Nor may Article III:4 be read to emasculate the policies and
interests of Article XX(g). See id.
150. See id. at 622. The Gasoline Appellate Report stated:
(A] s the preamble of Article XX indicates, the purpose of including Article XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for
measures serving trade policy purposes but merely to ensure that the
commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit of
policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
Id. (quoting World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Panel Report), 35
I.L.M. 274, 299 (Jan. 16, 1996); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures
Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (Canada-Salmon), Mar. 22,
1988, GAT" B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at 4.6 (1989)).
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of several prior panel reports, 15 1 the Appellate Body concluded that
a measure must be "primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustible natural resources in order to fall within the scope of Article

XX(g).

152

Using this interpretation, the Appellate Body turned to the
question of whether the baseline establishment rules were "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources within Article
XX(g). 153 The baseline establishment rules were designed to permit scrutiny and monitoring of the level of compliance with the
"non-degradation" requirements of the Gasoline Rule. 154 Without
baselines of some kind, such scrutiny would be impossible and the
Gasoline Rule's objective of preventing further deterioration of the
level of air pollution would be hindered. 155 Consequently, the Appellate Body found that the baseline establishment rules were "primarily aimed at" the conservation of natural resources for the
156
purposes of Article XX(g).
3.

If Such Measures are Made Effective in Conjunction with
Restrictions on Domestic Productionor Consumption

Having found that the baseline establishment rules satisfied
the first requirement of Article XX(g), the Appellate Body next
considered whether the baseline establishment rules satisfied the
"made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" requirement of Article

XX(g). 1 5 7

Once

151. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 622 n.37 (May 20, 1996) (citing GATT Dispute Panel Report on United
States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin I), 33 I.L.M. 839 (June
1994); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Taxes on Automobiles, 33
I.L.M. 1397 (Oct. 11, 1994)). The Appellate Body noted that all of the parties to
the appeal accepted the validity of this view. See id. at 622.
152. See id. at 622-23. However, the Appellate Body noted that the phrase
"primarily aimed at" was not itself treaty language and thus was not a litmus test for
the inclusion or exclusion of measures from Article XX(g). See id. at 623. Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not elaborate further on this point.
153. See id.
154. See id. The Appellate Body noted that the baseline establishment rules
could not be understood in isolation, but rather needed to be read in relation to
the "non-degradation" requirements set out elsewhere in the Gasoline Rule. See id.
155. See id. The Appellate Body noted that the relationship between the establishment rules and the "non-degradation" requirements of the Gasoline Rule
was not negated by any inconsistency between the baseline establishment rules and
Article 111:4. See id.
156. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 623.
157. See id. The United States argued that this second requirement of Article
XX(g) should be interpreted to mean that the burdens associated with regulating
pollutants must not be imposed only on imported gasoline. See id. In contrast,
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again applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention,158 the Appellate

Body determined that the phrases "made effective" and "in conjunction with," taken together, refer to "governmental measures
like the baseline establishment rules being promulgated or brought
into effect together with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption of natural resources." 159 However, the Appellate
Body indicated that this was a requirement of even-handedness, not
identical treatment. 160 Applying this requirement of even-handedness to the baseline establishment rules, the Appellate Body found
that the rules met the requirement because the restrictions on the
consumption or depletion of clean air through the regulation of
the domestic production of gasoline were established jointly with
16
corresponding restrictions for imported gasoline. 1
Finally, the Appellate Body stated that the clause "if made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption" did not establish an empirical "effects test" under Article XX(g).162 An effects test was considered inappropriate beVenezuela and Brazil pointed to prior panel reports which indicated that a measure must be "primarily aimed at" making effective certain restrictions on domestic
production or consumption. See id. at 624 n.38 (citing GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Restrictions on Imports of Tuna (Tuna/Dolphin I1), 33
I.L.M. 839 (June 1994); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Taxes on
Automobiles, 33 I.L.M. 1397 (Oct. 11, 1994); GATT Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon (CanadaSalmon), Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) at
4.6-4.7 (1989)). Venezuela and Brazil also argued that clean air was not a natural resource under Article
XX(g), thus making impossible the existence of restrictions on domestic production or consumption of a natural resource. See id. at 623. Finally, Venezuela
claimed that the United States had failed to meet its burden of showing that the
baseline establishment rules have had "some positive conservation effect." Id. at
624 n.39.
158. See id. at 624.
159. Id. The Appellate Body stated that the ordinary meaning of "made effective" when used in connection with a governmental measure could be seen to refer
to such governmental measure being "operative," as "in force," or as having "come
into effect." See id. at 624 (citing THE NEW SHORTER OxFORi ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 786 (L. Brown ed. 1993)). The Appellate Body also
concluded that the phrase "in conjunction with" could mean "together with" or
"jointly with." See id. at 624 (citing THE NEW SHORTER OxFoRi ENGLISH DICTIONARY ON HISTORICAL PRINCIPLES 481 (L. Brown ed. 1993)).
160. See id. at 625. The Appellate Body noted that there was no textual basis
for requiring identical treatment of domestic and imported products. See id.
161. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 625 (May 20, 1996). The Appellate Body noted that the fact that imported gasoline had been accorded "less favourable treatment" than domestic gasoline was irrelevant under the Article XX(g) analysis. See id. The Appellate Body
also noted that Article XX(g) speaks "disjunctively of domestic production or consumption." See id. (emphasis added).
162. See id. at 625-26.
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cause not only is determining causation difficult, but a substantial
period of time may have to elapse before the effects of an implemented measure can be observed.' 63 However, the Appellate Body
added that considerations of predictable effects of a measure may
be appropriate in particular cases.' 64
4.

The Introductory Provisions of Article XX Applying the
Preamble

Having found that the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline Rule fell within the terms of Article XX(g), the Appellate
Body stated that it must determine whether those rules met the requirements set forth in the Preamble to Article XX(g). 1 65 The Appellate Body had little guidance in determining the requirements
of the Preamble because only two prior panels had applied the Preamble to Article XX. 166 Noting that the Preamble addresses the
question of how a measure is applied, 16 7 the Appellate Body stated
163. See id. Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not elaborate on why determining causation is difficult or why a substantial period of time may have to
elapse before the effects of an implemented measure may be observed.
164. See id. The Appellate Body elaborated by stating that if a particular "measure cannot in any possible situation have any positive effect on conservation
goals," the measure was probably not "primarily aimed at [the] conservation of
natural resources. . .

."

Id.

Unfortunately, the Appellate Body did not give an

example of such a measure.
165. See id. at 626.
166. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 628 n.46 (citing GATT Dispute
Panel Report on United States - Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada (United States Tuna), Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.)
at 4.8 (1983); GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States - Imports of Certain
Automotive Spring Assemblies (United States Spring Assemblies), May 26, 1983, GATT
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 7 54-56 (1983)).
In United States Spring Assemblies, a panel found that an exclusion order was
not applied in a manner that constituted a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because the order was directed against imports of automotive spring
assemblies produced in violation of United States patent law "from all foreign
sources, and not just from Canada." See United States Spring Assemblies, GATT
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 55 (emphasis added). The panel found two reasons why
the exclusion order was not applied in a manner that constituted a disguised restriction on international trade. See id. at 1 56. First, notice had been published in
the Federal Register. See id. Second, before the exclusion order could be issued,
the validity of a patent and its infringement had to be established. See id.
In United States Tuna, import prohibitions on tuna were found to not necessarily be arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination because actions were not taken
against Canada only, but also against Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru for
similar reasons. United States Tuna, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 4.8 (emphasis
added). Further, the import prohibitions on tuna were not considered a disguised
restriction on international trade because they were taken as trade measures and
publicly announced. See id. (emphasis added).
167. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
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that the purpose and object of the Article XX Preamble is to prevent the abuse of Article XX exceptions. 168
169
Applying a corollary to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention,
the Appellate Body concluded that the Preamble to Article XX cannot refer to the same standards used to find a violation of a substantive rule of GATT. 170 Noting that the field of application of the
standards set forth in the Preamble to Article XX was not at issue,
the Appellate Body stated that the Preamble's standards are applicable to all situations in which an allegation of a substantive rule
has been made and justification under an exception of Article XX
has been invoked. 171 Such a reading was in accordance with the
common understanding of the parties. 72 In addition, the Preamble's phrase "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to pre1.L.M. at 623, 626 n.43 (May 20, 1996) (citing United States Spring Assemblies, GATT
B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 1 56).
168. See id. at 623, 625 n. 4 4 . The Preamble embodies the principle that while
Article XX exceptions may be invoked as a matter of legal right, these exceptions
must not be used to defeat legal obligations under GATT. See id. at 626. The
Appellate Body noted that the burden of showing that a measure does not violate
the Preamble rests on the party invoking the exception. See id. at 626-27. This is a
heavier burden than showing that a measure falls within the exception of Article
XX(g). See id.
169. Id. at 627 n.45. This corollary states that an interpreter must give meaning and effect to all terms of a treaty and may not adopt a "reading that would
result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility." Id.
170. See id. at 627. To conclude otherwise would render both the Preamble
and the exceptions in paragraphs (a) through (j) devoid of meaning. See id. Such
a recourse would confuse the question of whether there was a violation of a substantive rule of GATT with the question of whether the violation was justifiable
under Article XX. See id.
171. See id. at 628. As a result of the Preamble, a measure falling within the
exception of Article XX(g) is prohibited if it constitutes "(a) arbitrary discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; (b) unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail; or (c) disguised
restriction on international trade." Id. at 627.
172. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 627-28. The United States assumed that the phrase "between countries where the same conditions prevail," included in the "arbitrary discrimination" and "unjustifiable discrimination"
standards, referred to conditions in importing and exporting countries as well as
between exporting countries. See id. With respect to the standard "disguised restriction on international trade," the United States assumed that it was applicable
to a case in which a violation of Article 111:4 had been found. See id. at 628. These
assumptions were not challenged by Venezuela or Brazil. See id. Rather, Venezuela argued that the United States had failed to meet all of the standards included in the Preamble. See id.
The Appellate Body further noted that the term "countries" in the Preamble
is textually unqualified. See id. at 628-29 n.46. In addition, treaties comparable to
GAT1 have used specific terms, not included in GATT, to show a specific intent.
See id. However, these comparable treaties are not noted as pertaining to the
"travaux preparatoires" of GATT. See id.
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vent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
173
measures . . ." supported the parties' common understanding.

Accordingly, the Appellate Body determined that the standards set
forth in the Preamble could be best read side-by-side, imparting
17 4
meaning to one another.
Next, the Appellate Body considered the United States' justifications for using statutory baselines that did not differentiate between domestic and imported gasoline. 175 First, the United States
claimed that individual baselines for foreign refiners were not implemented because they would generate administrative problems,
including verification and enforcement.1 76 However, the Appellate
Body found that the United States failed to adequately explore existing means, especially government cooperation, to mitigate these
administrative problems. 177 Second, the United States argued that
the statutory baseline requirements were not imposed on domestic
refiners because of the physical and financial problems this would
173. Id. at 628. Such a reading of the Preamble to Article XX gives effect to
the words "nothing in this Agreement" and Article XX as whole. See id.
174. See id. at 629. In so doing, the Appellate Body noted the fundamental
theme of avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of Article XX exceptions. See id. Accordingly, the Appellate Body found that: (1) "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination in international trade; (2) concealed or unannounced
restriction or discrimination in international trade does not exhaust the meaning
of "disguised restriction;" and (3) disguised restriction includes restrictions
amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination in international trade taken
under the guise of a measure within an Article XX exception. See id. Considerations pertinent to deciding whether a measure amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" may also be used to determine the presence of a "disguised
restriction" on international trade. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 629-30. The United States claimed that if" 'individual baselines
were established for several foreign refiners, the importer would be tempted to
claim the refinery of origin that presented the most benefits in terms of baseline
restrictions, and tracking the refinery of origin would be very difficult because gasoline is a fungible commodity.'" Id.
177. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 631-32 (May 20, 1996). In the area of international trade, there exists
"established techniques for checking, verifying, assessing and enforcing data relating to imported goods." Id. at 631. The Appellate Body concluded that the
United States must have known that cooperative arrangements with foreign governments were necessary and appropriate for these techniques to be effective. See
id. Therefore, there arose a strong implication that the United States did not explore such cooperative arrangements, at least not to the point where uncooperative governments would have been discovered. See id.
Noting that it was not speculating on the limits of effective international cooperation, the Appellate Body noted several methods used by countries to solve the
problems of enforcement agencies whose relevant law and authority does not cross
national borders. See id. at 631 n.52. Such methods include cooperative agreements between governments and agreements within the framework of the WTO
that recognize the significance of this type of cooperation. See id.
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have caused the domestic refiners.1 78 Yet, the Appellate Body
noted that there was no evidence that the United States considered
the problems faced by foreign refiners as a result of imposing the
179
statutory baselines.
In sum, the Appellate Body found the United States guilty of
two omissions. 18 0 First, it found the United States guilty of failing to
adequately explore available means, especially government cooperation, of mitigating administrative problems.1 8 1 Second, it concluded that the United States failed to consider the costs to foreign
refiners which would result from the imposition of statutory baselines. 182 Finally, noting that the resulting discrimination must have
been foreseen rather than inadvertent or unavoidable, the Appellate Body held that the baseline establishment rules of the Gasoline
Rule constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "disguised re183
striction on international trade."
B.

Critical Analysis
1. Treaty Interpretation: Canons of Treaty Interpretation and
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention

For several reasons, the Appellate Body acted correctly in its
application of both the general rule of treaty interpretation expressed in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention and the corollary to
Article 31 to interpret Article XX(g) of GATT. 18 4 First, with respect
to international law, there are three different canons of interpretation: (1) "the text as the authentic expression of the intention of
the law-maker;"1 8 5 (2) the intention of the law-maker as a subjective
178. See id. at 632. The United States stated that the imposition of the statutory baselines on domestic refiners would have been "physically and financially
impossible because of the magnitude of the changes required in almost all US
refineries; it thus would have caused a substantial delay in the programme." Id.
(quoting World Trade Organization Dispute Panel Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Panel Report), 35
I.L.M. 274, 287 (Jan. 16, 1996)).
179. See id. at 632.
180. See id. Although the Appellate Body did not indicate what was a minimal
omission that would violate Article 111:4 of GAIT, the Appellate Body noted that
these omissions went "well beyond what was necessary" to find a violation of Article
111:4. Id.
181. See id.
182. See GasolineAppellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 632.
183. See id.
184. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's use of Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention and the corollary to Article 31, see supra notes 146-52, 157-61 & 169-74
and accompanying text. For the textual language of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention as well as a corollary to Article 31, see supra notes 144 & 169.
185. DANIEL P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 251-64 (2d ed. 1970); OPPEN-
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element independent of the text; 186 and (3) "the declared or apparent objects and purposes of the legal rule concerned. ' 18 7 The second canon, however, is unsuitable for the interpretation of
international agreements primarily because of the manner in which
international agreements are drafted.1 8 8 Thus, the Appellate
Body's use of Article 31 was proper since it is in accordance with the
first and third canons of interpretation, but disregards the second
canon.' 8 9 Next, as the Appellate Body pointed out, Article 31 has
attained the status of a rule of customary international law. 1 90 Customary international law is binding on international organizations
such as the WTO. 19 1 Moreover, the WTO has been expressly directed to use "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" to clarify "covered agreements" of the Agreement
192
Establishing the World Trade Organization, including GATT.
HEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 145, §§ 631-633; HENRY G. SCHERMERS &
NIELS M. BLOCKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAw: UNITY WITHIN DrvERsITY

§ 1346 (1995); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAw 583-84 (3d ed. 1991).
When interpreting international agreements, the text is usually given priority. See
SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra, § 1347. However, it should be noted that because of
the living character of international organizations, the "primacy of the wording of
the text" may be of lesser importance. Id.
186. See O'CONNEt., supra note 185, at 251-64; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW, supra note 145, at §§ 631-633; SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra note 185, at
§ 1346; SHAW, supra note 185, at 583-84.
187. O'CONNELL, supra note 185, at 251-64; OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 145, at §§ 631-633; SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra note 185, at § 1346;
SHAw, supra note 185, at 583-84.
188. See SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra note 185, at § 1348. Article 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties classifies the intention of the law-maker a
"supplementary means of interpretation." See Vienna Convention, supra note 144,
art. 32; SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra note 185, at § 1348. Moreover, the International Court ofJustice has expressly stated that there is no need to refer to preparatory documents if the text is sufficiently clear. See SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra
note 185, at § 1348. Furthermore, although a common intention can be identified
only from statements made at the drafting of the treaty, many parties may not have
been present at the drafting. See id. Finally, too many parties have been involved
in the drafting of the treaty to ascertain a clear intention. See id.
189. See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 145, at §§ 631-37; SHAw,
supra note 185, at 583-84.
190. It is widely accepted that the provisions of the Vienna Convention are
either a codification of customary international law, or have become customary
international law. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND

MATERIALS 418 (3d ed. 1993). The U.S. Executive recognizes the Vienna Convention
as an authoritative guide to customary international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw Or THE UNITED STATES § 301 (1987). For a listing of
the Appellate Body's authority for the proposition that Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention is customary international law, see supra note 145.
191. See SCHERMERS & BLOCKER, supra note 185, at § 1339.
192. Understanding on Disputes, supra note 74, art. 3(2). Article 3 of the
Understanding on Disputes states:
The dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in provid-
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Interpretationof Article XX(g)

Several aspects of the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article
XX(g) lend hope that Article XX(g) may be used tojustify environmental, but GATT-inconsistent measures.1 9 3 First, in interpreting
the phrase "relating to" to mean "primarily aimed at,"'194 the Article
XX(g) exception is still read broader than the Article XX(b) exception.1 9 5 Second, the Appellate Body's interpretation of the phrase
"made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption" guards against protectionism but allows
governments to justify environmental legislation that is GATT inconsistent. 19 6 Finally, in rejecting an empirical effects test, the Aping security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The
Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of
Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law. Recommendations and rulings of the
DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the
covered agreements.
Id.
Of interesting note is the fact that at least two scholars claim that use of the
phrase "customary rules of interpretation of public international law" is a "direct,
albeit implicit, invocation of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties." Croley & Jackson, supra note 71, at 200.
193. For a discussion of those aspects of the Appellate Body's decision that
may allow domestic environmental measures to be justified under Article XX(g),
see infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
194. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's interpretation of the phrase "relating to" to mean "primarily aimed at," see supra notes 137-56 and accompanying
text.
195. See Eliza Patterson, International Trade and the Environment: Institutional
Solutions, 21 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,599, 10,602 n.39 (citing GATT Dispute Panel Report
on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon
(Canada-Salmon), Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) (1989)). "'Relating
to' has been interpreted by a GATT panel as implying a wider range of measures
than only those that could be characterized as necessary or essential." Id. Further,
GAT panels have consistently interpreted the Article XX(b) exception to include
a "necessary" test. See id. For a discussion of cases that interpret and apply the
requirements of Article XX(b) and (g), including the Article XX(b) necessary test,
see supra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
196. The Appellate Body held that this phrase includes the requirement that
environmental measures must impose restrictions on both foreign and domestic
refiners. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 624 (May 20, 1996). Because restrictions must apply domestically as well
as abroad, it is difficult for a domestic government to pass protectionist measures.
See id. at 624-25. Nevertheless, the Appellate Body held that this phrase does not
require identical treatment. See id. at 625. Domestic governments may choose
from a greater variety of environmental measures, some of which may have different effects abroad than domestically. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's interpretation and application of the phrase "made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption," see supra notes 157-64 and
accompanying text.
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pellate Body eliminated one mechanism that could have seriously
hindered a nation's ability to pass domestic environmental
legislation.

1 97

3. Justificationsfor Environmental Legislation that is GATTInconsistent may be Eliminated by the Interpretationof the
Preamble to Article XX
Despite promising elements of the Appellate Body's decision,
several aspects of the decision may make it more difficult to justify
environmental measures under Article XX.198 Although it did not
define "disguised restriction" in full, the Appellate Body attempted
to give some substance to its contents. 199 The Appellate Body declared that the phrase "disguised restriction" includes disguised discrimination.2 0 0 This view is consistent with prior cases that
considered the public announcement of measures to be a factor in
determining whether they were a "disguised restriction." 20 1 The
Appellate Body also found that the phrase "disguised restriction"
included "concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination." 20 2 This finding is a minor extension of prior GATT panels'

dislike of GATT-inconsistent measures that are not readily apparent. 20 3 Finally, the Appellate Body's holding that "disguised restric-

tion" embraces "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," 20 4 while
not clearly justified or explained, 20 5 has several important implications. It implies that if a measure amounts to "arbitrary or unjustifi197. An effects test would have placed too much emphasis on other provisions of GATT, at the expense of Article XX(g). This is the first time that any
WTO body addressed the issue of an empirical effects test. In contrast to the Appellate Body's holding, one commentator believes that an Article XX(g) effects
test would be desirable. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 57, at 827-63. For the Appellate Body's rejection of an empirical effects test, see supranotes 162-64 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion of those aspects of the Appellate Body's decision that
may make it more difficult to justify environmental measures under Article XX(g),
see infra notes 199-214 and accompanying text.
199. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's interpretation of the term "disguised restriction," see supra notes 165-74 and accompanying text.
200. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 629.
201. See, e.g.,
United States Spring Assemblies, supra note 166, at
54-56; United
States Tuna, supra note 166, at 1 4.8.
202. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 629 (May 20, 1996).
203. For a discussion of prior panels' dislike of GAIT-inconsistent measures
that are not readily apparent, see supa note 166 and accompanying text.
204. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 629.
205. See id. In defining "disguised restriction," the Appellate Body merely
stated that the terms "arbitrary discrimination," "unjustifiable discrimination" and
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able discrimination" it may also, but not necessarily, constitute a
"disguised restriction."' 20 6 The Appellate Body's decision also implies that a measure may constitute a "disguised restriction," but not
"arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination." 0 7
Several important issues arise in the application of these Article XX Preamble requirements. 20 8 First, the Appellate Body appeared to analyze the baseline establishment rules under the
unjustifiable discrimination prohibition of the Article XX Preamble. 20 9 In evaluating the justification, however, the Appellate Body

appeared to apply a standard similar to the "necessary" test of Article XX(b). 2 10 Such a reading would emasculate the "primarily
"disguised restriction" may be read side-by-side, imparting meaning to one another. See id.
206. See id. The Appellate Body stated that "the kinds of considerations pertinent in deciding whether the application of a particular measure amounts to 'arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination,' may also be taken into account in
determining the presence of a 'disguised restriction' on international trade." Id.
207. See id.
208. For a discussion of the Appellate Body's application of the Article XX
Preamble requirements, see supra notes 165-83 and accompanying text.
209. See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate Report), 35
I.L.M. at 632-33 (May 20, 1996). First, the Appellate Body held that the baseline
establishment rules constituted "unjustifiable discrimination." See id. Second, the
Appellate Body viewed the United States' stated difficulties "as insufficient to justify the denial to foreign refiners of individual baselines permitted to domestic
refiners." Id. at 630. Thus, it is apparent that the Appellate Body applied some
type of justification analysis.
210. As interpreted by prior panels, a necessary test requires that a party use a
measure consistent with, or least inconsistent with GATT, if reasonably available.
See Phillips, supranote 57, at 830. For a discussion of cases interpreting and applying the Article XX(b) "necessary" test, see supra notes 92-126 and accompanying
text.
Several Appellate Body statements seem to recognize this necessary test. First,
the Appellate Body noted the existence of GATF-consistent measures, the individual baselines. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 629. The implication is that
these measures should have been used unless they were not reasonably available.
Second, the Appellate Body noted that cooperative arrangements with other governments would have allowed the use of the GATI-consistent measures. See id. at
631. However, if the United States inquired into such arrangements, it did not do
so "to the point where it encountered governments that were willing to cooperate."
Id. The implication is that the United States was obligated to discover whether the
GAIT-consistent measures were reasonably available to it.
There are two parts of the Appellate Body's analysis, however, that do not
appear to be strictly tailored to a necessary test. First, it was noted that the United
States did nothing other than "disregard [costs] ... when it came to foreign refiners." Id. at 632. Rather than deciding which measures were reasonably available to
the United States, the Appellate Body appeared to be judging the reasonableness
of the GATT-inconsistent measures actually used. Second, the Appellate Body's
statement that "[ti he resulting discrimination must have been foreseen, and was
not merely inadvertent or unavoidable" is confusing. Id. at 633. It can be inferred
that if the discrimination was "unavoidable" it would have been excused. Such a
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aimed at" requirement of the Article XX(g) exception.2 11
Second, the Appellate Body considered the baseline establishment rules a "disguised restriction on international trade."21 2 However, it is not clear how the Appellate Body came to this
conclusion. 2 13 It is these two factors, (1) a stricter "necessary" requirement, and (2) an unexplained "disguised restriction" finding,
that could negatively impact a domestic government's ability to pro214
tect the environment.
result would be consistent with a necessary test because if discrimination is "unavoidable," evidently less GATI inconsistent measures are not reasonably available.
However, the mere fact that discrimination is "foreseen" cannot cause it to fail the
Article XX Preamble requirement. For example, discrimination may be "foreseen," but may result from the only reasonable measure available. It is unlikely
that a measure would be considered unjustified under Article XX in such a situation. Similarly, it is unlikely that discrimination would be justified under Article
XX just because the discrimination was "inadvertent." Such a reading would allow
countries to violate the obligations under GATT by pleading ignorance.
211. Such a reading would require that for a measure to be justified under
Article XX(g) it must pass both the "primarily aimed at" test of Article XX(g) and
the "necessary test" of the Preamble. However, if a measure is found to be "necessary" to the conservation of exhaustive natural resources, the measure is most likely
.primarily aimed at" the conservation of exhaustive natural resources. Therefore,
the "primarily aimed at" test is rendered superfluous. Such a result would violate
the corollary to Article 31 that states all provisions of a treaty should be given
effect. For a discussion of the Article 31 corollary, see supra note 169.
212. See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 629.
213. First, the Appellate Body found that "disguised restriction" includes "disguised discrimination." See World Trade Organization Appellate Report on United
States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline Appellate
Report), 35 I.L.M. at 629 (May 20, 1996). However, there was no mention of "disguised discrimination" in the Appellate Body's analysis of the baseline establishment rules under the Article XX Preamble. See id. at 627-33. Also, like prior cases,
the measure was probably not considered "disguised" because the measure was
published in the Federal Register. See 40 C.F.R. § 80. For a discussion of cases that
considered, within its analysis, publication of a regulation, see supra note 166.
Second, the Appellate Body found that "disguised restriction" also includes
'concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in international trade."
See Gasoline Appellate Report, 35 I.L.M. at 629. Again, the measure could not be
considered "concealed or unannounced" because it was published in the Federal
Register. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.
Third, "disguised restriction" includes "arbitrary discrimination." See id. Yet,
there is no mention of "arbitrary discrimination" within the Appellate Body's analysis of the baseline establishment rules under the Article XX Preamble. See id. at
627-33.
Finally, while a measure that amounts to "unjustifiable discrimination" may
also constitute a "disguised restriction," such a finding does not appear to be
mandatory. See id. at 629. Indeed, use of the disjunctive "or" would seem to indicate separate and distinct tests. While the same facts may be used in finding both
"disguised restriction" and "unjustifiable discrimination," the Appellate Report
does not elaborate upon the relationship between the two. See id.
214. For a critique of the Appellate Body's finding of a necessary test in the
Preamble of Article XX and its unexplained "disguised restriction" finding, see
supra notes 198-213 and accompanying text.
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IMPACT

Focusing on trade, GATT was adopted with little emphasis on
environmental concerns. 2 15 Consequently, environmentalists have
had to resort exclusively to Article XX(b) and (g) in order tojustify
environmental measures.2 16 Specifically, environmentalists have relied heavily upon Article XX(g) because it has been interpreted
more broadly than Article XX(b).217 In contrast to GATT, the
2 18
WTO expressly embodies environmental principles in its charter.
However, the WTO's Appellate Body threatens to further diminish
the effectiveness of protecting environmental measures under Article XX, including Article XX(g).219

First, protecting the environment will be more difficult if the
Appellate Body has incorporated a "necessary" test into the Article
XX Preamble. The possibilities of justification under the Article
XX(g) exception will be narrowed because environmental measures will be subjected to a stricter additional test. Further, the
other Article XX exceptions may be similarly limited since the Preamble is applicable to all exceptions within Article XX. Second, it
is not clear how the Appellate Body's interpretation of the Preamble's disguised restriction prohibition will affect the justification of
environmental measures under Article XX. Future cases will necessarily have to flesh out the contents of this prohibition.
HansJ Crosby
215. See Christopher A. Cherry, Environmental Regulation Within the GATT Regime: A New Definition of "Product",40 UCLA L. REv. 1061, 1066-67 (1992) (citing
Patterson, supranote 195, at 10,600) (mentioning Preamble's objective of developing full use of resources of world and expanding production of goods but not
mentioning environmental protection or sustainable development); see also Kyle E.
McSlarrow, InternationalTrade and the Environment: Buildinga Frameworkfor Conflict
Resolution, 21 ENv-rL. L. REP. 10,589, 10,593 (1991) (noting GATT focuses on trade
in world that does not consider trade above other policies).
216. For a discussion of cases that have interpreted and applied Article XX(b)
and (g), see supra notes 78-126 and accompanying text.
217. See Patterson, supranote 195, at 10,602 n.39 (citing GATT Dispute Panel
Report on Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon (Canada-Salmon), Mar. 22, 1988, GATT B.I.S.D. (35th Supp.) (1989)).
"'Relating to' has been interpreted by a GATT panel as implying a wider range of
measures than only those that could be characterized as necessary or essential." Id.
218. For a discussion of those environmental principles expressly embodied
in the WTO Agreement, see supra note 72 and accompanying text.
219. For a discussion of how the Appellate Body's holding threatens to diminish the effectiveness of protecting environmental measures under Article XX, see
supra notes 198-214 and accompanying text.
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